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Constitutional Law - Interstate Travel - The Validity of a
State Airport Facilities Tax Measured by Enplaning Passengers
The growth of civil aviation has outpaced national and state predictions'
and, as a result, has created serious problems in terms of providing adequate airport facilities.! A state can finance the increasing costs for such
facilities through general fund appropriations, although these appropriations have not proved satisfactory because of the limited local resources
available and the acute demands of the major traffic generating hubs.3 In
addition, the state can enact special measures providing for the collection
of fees in consideration for the use of its public airsport by virtue of its
proprietary interest in its public property.4 The state's power to levy for
the use ofits public facilities is, however, not unlimited; but determining
the permissible scope within which the state may act in imposing such
charges often gives rise to considerable difficulty. For example, several state
legislatures have enacted measures providing for collection of fees from
commercial aircraft measured by enplanement' Because of the peculiarly
interstate nature of aircraft transportation, such measures, though labeled
a service charge, pose serious constitutional questions. In particular, constitutional challenges are based on the proposition that an enplaning fee
bears no reasonable relationship to the use of the facility for which it was
collected and therefore abridges: (1) the constitutionally protected right
of interstate commerce to be free of unreasonable burdens and (2) the
fourteenth amendment due process clause, which requires a sufficient nexus
between the taxed business and the taxing state. Moreover, Supreme Court
cases suggest at least four provisions of the Constitution as the basis for
I Over the past five years, the certified air carrier fleet has increased from substantially a piston
fleet of 2,079 aircraft to an almost completely jet fleet of 2,586 aircraft. In terms of capacity,
the seat-miles flown have increased from 94.8 billion to 210 billion. By 1980, it is estimated that
the domestic certified airlines will enplane 420 million passengers, almost tripling the 1969 figure.
Hearings on H.R. 14,465 Before the Subcomm. on Avi. of the Senate Commerce Comm., 91st
Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. (1969-70). See FAA, AVIATION DEMAND AND AIRPORT FORE-CASTS FOR
LARGE TRANSPORTATION HUBS THROUGH 1980 (Aug. 19, 1967).
' The most serious manifestation of the problem has been congestion. It has been estimated that
aircraft delays at airports cost the airlines in excess of $50 million a year. This is exclusive of
the substantial cost to the passenger in terms of lost time and inconveniences.
a Facilities and appropriation forecasts have proved to be only about two-thirds of the actual
needs in most states; see note I supra.
4
Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610 (1915); Dixie Ohio Express 1221 (1960). A discussion
of the cases involving aircraft taxation can be found in Annot., 98 L.Ed. 982 (1953).
'Five states specifically provide by statute for enplaning fees: Montana, MONT. REV. ConEs
ANN. § 1-829 (Supp. 1969); Nebraska, NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-159 (3 Av. L. REP. 5 13,060)
(1969); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 423:43 (1959); New Jersey, ch. 200 §
15.15 [1969] N.J. Acts 70 (passed over veto); and Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 5.1-77 to 82
(Supp. 1968). In at least one state, Indiana, a municipal ordinance imposes a levy upon enplaning
passengers. Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority District, Ind., Ordinance 33 (1968). Various agencies or municipalities in California, Hawaii, North Carolina, and Washington have considered imposing enplaning fees upon passenger air carriers, but have refused to act after receiving
opinions from the respective attorney generals of those states that such fees would be unconstitutional. See, e.g., Op. Atty. Gen. Wash., 3 Av. L. REp. 5 23,245 (1962).
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a protected right of travel, which would limit the state in imposing taxation upon interstate passengers: (1) the privileges or immunities clause
of the fourteenth amendment, (2) the due process clauses of the fifth and
fourteenth amendment, (3) the commerce clause and (4) the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.'
In Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Joint City-County Airport Board' the
Montana Supreme Court considered constitutional objections to a statute
authorizing the collection of a one dollar fee for every passenger embarking commercial aircraft at public airports located within the state.' Rejecting the argument that the feeis a valid use charge, the court reached a
novel and unexpected decision by holding the fee invalid because it fell
directly on an integral aspect of interstate travel, indicating that the statute
was in violation of an absolute ban on state interference with the passenger's constitutional right to travel.9
Using Northwest Airlines as a framework for analysis, this note will
consider the constitutional vulnerability of state legislation providing for
a service charge measured by enplaning passengers and the extent, if any,
a passenger's right to travel limits an otherwise valid statute.
I.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON PUBLIC FACILITIES TAXATION

A. Due Process and Commerce Clause Restrictions
The restrictions of the commerce clause and the fourteenth amendment

due process clause upon a state charging for the use of its public facilities
'The right to travel was grounded upon the privileges and immunities clause of article IV, §
2 in Paul v. Virginia, 79 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1969); Ward v. Maryland, 75 U.S. (12 Wall.)
418 (1871); see also Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1873); Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908); Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546, 552 (No. 3230) (C.C.E.D.
Pa. 1825). Reliance was placed on the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment in Twining v. New Jersey, supra; Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 183-85 (1941)
(concurring opinion); compare Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868). In the Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849), and Edwards v. California, supra, the Court employed
a commerce clause approach. The due process clause of the fifth amendment was utilized in the
passport cases where the Court upheld the right to travel outside the country. See Kent v. Dulles,
357 U.S. 116 (1958). Finally, the source of the right was dismissed as "basic" in United States
v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966), and "fundamental" in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
See generally, CHAFEE, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787 184-87 (1956)
[Hereinafter cited as CHAFFEE] Vestal, Freedom of Movement, 41 IowA L. REv. 6 (1955). A
discussion of article IV would be irrelevant for purposes of this note, as it is settled that it only
prevents a state from discrimination against citizens of other states in favor of its own. Hague v.
CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 511 (1939).
7463 P.2d 470 (Mont. 1970).
'MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 1-829 (Supp. 1969):
Every city or county which constructs, operates or maintains, individually or jointly,
a public airport with funds contributed in whole or in part, directly or indirectly,
by the state, county, city or other public authority, is authorized and empowered to
require every passenger air carrier for hire which uses the airport for commercial
use of aircraft to pay a service charge of one dollar ($1) for each passenger enplaning upon its aircraft at any such public airport as a point of origin for transportation
purposes.
'Subsequent to the Northwest Airlines decision, a New Jersey lower court enjoined the enforcement of ch. 200 § 15.15 [1969] N.J. Acts 70, authorizing enplaning fees in that state.
Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Sills, No. C 993-69 (Superior Ct. N.J. Ch. Div., Essex Cy, April 22,
1970). The basis of the decision was the same as in Northwest Airlines, and the court relied heavily
upon that case. The constitutionality of the Indiana statute is presently being contested in the
courts of that state. Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., No. 869S179
1970). The New Hampshire Supreme Court, rendering an advisory
(Ind. Sup. Ct., filed -,
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overlap because of the similar tests used to determine whether a particular
state exaction is such as to invade the exclusive authority of Congress to
regulate trade between the states and whether a state complies with due
process nexus requirements. As to the former, the Supreme Court has held
that "[s]tate taxation falling on interstate commerce . . . can only be
justified as designed to make such comerce bear a fair share of of the cost
of the local government whose protection it enjoys."" In determining
whether a state tax falls within the confines of due process, the Court has
said that the "simple but controlling question is whether the state has
given anything for which it can ask returned."'" Because of the similarity
of the two tests, he Court has held that in some cases satisfaction of due
process nexus requirements for tax purposes will also satisfy the "reasonable burden" test of the commerce clause." Where, however, the state
charges for the use of its facilities, i.e., an enplaning fee, an answer to an
attack under one clause will not necessarily preclude an attack under the
other. For example, the nexus requirement would seem satisfied by the
fact that the aircraft is required to pay the fee. Where the fee is imposed
on the carrier for airport use, but the amount ofthefeeis measured by a
subject having no relation to the airport, the statute would probably be
struck as an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce." To allow for
this distinction, draftsmen of such statutes should be diligent to make the
charge compensatory for the use of the airport for which the fee is
levied."'
There are, however, more subtle distinctions. The Supreme Court in
2 required that any particular public facility tax on
Hendrick v. Maryland"
interstate carriers should be fixed according to some uniform, fair and
practical standard. Thus, a given statute is compensatory presumptively
established as valid where there appears: (1) a declaration by the state
legislature that the fee is in consideration for the use of the facility afforded
by the state," or (2) an17allocation of the proceeds of the fee for facility10
purposes" or (3) a tax formula based on actual or potential facility use.
Since Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice," the carrier may be limited to
opinion in an uncontested proceeding, sustained the validity of the New Hampshire statute on

state constitutional grounds. The court did not consider the proposed legislation's constitutionality
under the federal Constitution. Opinion of the Justices, 102 N.H. 73, 150 A.2d 522 (1959).
"°Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 253 (1945), quoted with approval in Nat'l Bellas Hess
v. Dept. of Revenue, supra at 756; see also Northwestern Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450,
462 (1958); Greyhound Lines v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 663 (1947).
Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940); quoted with approval in Nat'l
Bellas Hess v. Dept. of Revenue, supra at 756.
" American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459 (1919); Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Tax
Commn., 297 U.S. 403 (1936); Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, 308 U.S. 331 (1939); Ott v.
Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169 (1949).
"aSee Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610 (1915).
"'In Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of R.R. Commrs., 332 U.S. 495 (1947), the tax
was specifically declared by the statute to be "in consideration of the use of the public highway
of this State." See also Dixie Ohio Express Co. v. State Revenue Commn., 306 U.S. 72, 77 (1939).
'5 2 3 5 U.S. 610 (1915).
" Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of R.R. Commrs., 322 U.S. 495 (1947).
7

" Clark v. Poor, 274 U.S.

554 (1937).

'l Interstate Transit, Inc. v. Lindsey, 283 U.S. 183

as 3 3 9 U.S. 542 (1950).

(1931).
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attacking the presumptive validity of the statute on the sole ground that
the amount of the fee is unreasonable. In Capitol the Court held valid a
two per cent ad valorem tax levied on interstate motor carriers. Although
the Court recognized the "congenital infirmities" of the chalenged tax, it
nevertheless refused to weigh them, indicating that this type of evaluation should be made by Congress.' Moreover, if the statute contains a
declaration of compensation for facility use, not only may the carrier be
limited in its constitutional attack, the effect of Capitol also appears to
make the declaration conclusive and leaves the question of reasonableness
to the legislature. This is so because the establishment by the taxpayer of
the worth of reasonable compensation would seem to be an insuperable
difficulty.' The resulting consequences are well illustrated by the fact that
since Capitol the Court has never upset a public facility charge as unreasonable.'
B. The Right to Travel as a Limitation
From the earliest cases involving the question, the Supreme Court has
held valid a right to travel from one state to another and, necessarily, to
use the instrumentalities of interstate commerce to do so.' Yet, nowhere
in the Constitution is ingress and egress given specific protection, and there
is considerable debate among the commentators and jurists about what
clause in the Constitution provides the right." The explanation recently
accepted by the Court does not delineate any specific clause or provision,
but rather recognizes the right as arising from, and perhaps before, the
Constitution." Notwithstanding the character of the right, a problem
remains concerning the proper test in determining the extent to which
" It is significant that during various periods sharp debate has divided the Supreme Court on
the question of whether there exists a judicial function at all under the commerce clause with
respect to state laws affecting interstate commerce. See, e.g., the dissenting opinions of Justices
Swayne and Davis in the Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232, 282 (1872), and
Chief Justice Waite and Justices Field and Gray in their dissent in Robbins v. Shellby Co. Taxing
District, 120 U.S. 489, 499 (1887). Compare McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc., 309 U.S.
176, 188-99 (1940), with Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 339 U.S. 542 (1950). Shortly after
his appointment to the Court, Justice Black strongly objected to the doctrine that the Court has
the power to invalidate a statute in the absence of actual discrimination against Congress. Gwin,
White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 454 (dissenting opinion). His subsequently expressed views have been consistent, but milder. See, e.g., Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota,
322 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1944) (concurring opinion) (Court must proceed cautiously until Congress acts); McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc., supra (dissenting opinion) (case by case
lawmaking unsatisfactory to protect interstate commerce); Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice,
supra; accord, Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Tax Commn., 390 U.S. 317, 330-32 (1967). As can be
seen from Capitol, the Black viewpoint would permit almost unlimited latitude to the states. See
generally, Kunst, State Taxation of Incone from Interstate Commerce: New Dimensions of an old
Problem, 14 Sw. L.J. 1 (1960).
2 This resection of a tax formula as one criterion of testing tax validity is logically acceptable,
since the real issue is whether the charge is a quid quo pro within the practical limits of tax
administration. See notes 10-12 and accompanying text. Insofar as airport facilities are concerned,
there appear to be two ways in which reasonable compensation could be established: (1) assessment
of the costs incurred by the grantor of the privileges, or (2) subjective valuation of benefits
accruing to the grantee. The latter criterion cannot be ascertained, of course, without reference
to the business done by the taxpaying airline in question.
aaBode v. Barrett, 344 U.S. 583 (1953); see Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386
U.S. 753 (1967).
2"United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 458 (1965)
(concurring opinion).
24 See note 6, supra.
" See, e.g., United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1965).
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the right to travel among the states may limit the legitimate exercise of
state taxation for the use of public facilities.
1. Privileges and Immunities of Citizens. To abridge the privileges or
immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment,' the challenged state
action must contravene a right inherent in national, as opposed to state,
citizenship. 7 On the authority of Crandall v. Nevada' these privileges
have repeatedly been said to include the right of interstate travel, 29 presumably for the reason assigned in Crandall: state restrictions on travel
interfere with intercourse betweenthe national government and its citizens."0 To a certain extent this restriction duplicates the protection afforded
by other constitutional provisions, but a definition of the right as a privilege or immunity of national citizenship has considerable significance in
terms of legitimate state taxation versus a direct or indirect impact on the
right, because the use of that clause might be overly restrictive. For example, there is authority for the proposition that if passing from state to
state is a privilege or immunity protected by the fourteenth amendment,
then, whether by implication as in Crandall or by the express terms of the
amendment, no state can abridge it." Therefore, if a taxpayer is moving
interstate a strict interpretation of the clause would allow immunity from
taxation, even though there was extended use of public facilities while
the taxpayer passed through a particular state. The Supreme Court has
been extremely reluctant to create "constitutional refuges for a host of
rights traditionally subject to regulation. '
The reason for this reluctance to enlarge the scope of the clause has been
well understood since the decision of the Slaughter-House Cases .. .If its
restraint upon state action were extended more than is needful to protect
relationships between the citizens and the national government, and it did
more than duplicate the protection of liberty and property secured to persons
and citizens by other provisions of the Constitution, it would enlarge judicial
control of state action and multiply restrictions upon it to an extent difficult
to define, but sufficient to cause serious apprehension for the rightful independence of local government [Emphasis added.].'

Furthermore, the Court has specifically held that Congress, pursuant to
its commerce power, may empower the states to tax interstate commerce,
including persons moving in commerce, which would otherwise be pro2""No State shall make or enforce

any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities

of citizens of the United States."
7
" Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
2873 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868).
29
See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1873); Twining v. New Jersey,
211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908).
asWithout reference to the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court in Crandall enjoined
a Nevada tax of one dollar on each passenger leaving the state by common carrier. The Court
maintained that as the federal government has a "right" to summon its citizens to the national
capital, "the citizen also has correlative rights" to go to the federal government for purposes of
transacting business. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 44 (1868).
"5See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 250 (1964) (concurring opinion).
2 Id.
" Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 445 (1935); seeMadison v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940),
discussed infra at note 38.
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hibited by the negative implications of the commerce clause.' That the
fourteenth amendment is not binding upon Congress' demonstrates that
a fortiori a privilege or immunities clause objection to a state tax falling
upon interstate travel is highly questionable.
Apparently for the above reasons, even the rationale of Crandall came
under serious attack in Helson & Randolf v. Kentucky,0 where the Court
stated that "[t]o impose a tax upon the transit of passengers . .. between
the states is to regulate commerce and is beyond the state power . . . The
doctrine of Crandall v. Nevada . . . so far as it is to the contrary, has
not been followed."3 The privileges or immunities clause was reasserted
by the concurring Justices in Edwards v. California," but since that de-

cision not one Justice has given recognition to the clause as a possible
valid restriction in the five occasions that the Court has examined the
question.'
2. Due Process. In addition to the nexus requirement imposed upon the
state when it levies a tax, the due process clause can restrict this power
when it unreasonably restricts the freedom of interstate travel. Both the

fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution contain provisions
that no person shall be deprived of "life, liberty or property without due
process of law." These clauses have impact not only on procedural techniques, but also on substantive law, and in a number of cases the due
process concept has been used to limit actions of states encroaching on the
right to travel.' The Supreme Court squarely ruled on the matter in
Kent v. Dulles,41 where the Court said that "[t]he right to travel is a
part of the 'liberty' of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due
process of law . . . Freedom of movement across frontiers . . . and inside
4

Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 228 U.S. 408 (1946).
'Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
646 (1969) (dissenting opinion).
36279 U.S. 245 (1929).
37 Id. An argument can be made that Justice Sutherland, speaking
for the majority, was referring to that part of Crandall which denied that the tax was forbidden by the commerce clause,
rather than the assertion that the right of ingress and egress was a privilege of national citizenship.
In the subsequent case of Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935), however, Justice Sutherland
re-asserted that interstate travel was a privilege of national citizenship in holding a state tax unconstitutional which discriminated against income from out-of-state investments. As a result,
Justice Reed, joined by Brandies and Cardozo, in a rigorous dissent, pointed out that Sutherland,
himself, had overruled Crandall so far as the "latter referred to the protection of such commerce
to the privileges or immunities, rather than the commerce clause." Id. at 444. Colgate was overruled in Madison v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940), where the Court denied that the carrying
out of an incident of trade is a privilege of national citizenship. Justice Reed, for the majority,
did not expressly deny, however, that the right of ingress and egress was such a privilege. Also,
Crandall must still be distinguished from the fourteenth amendment, because that case did not
necessarily require state action. Thus, apparently Crandall may be asserted against private restrictions on the right to travel. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966). But see, Williams v.
Fears, 179 U.S. 270 (1900).
50314 U.S. 183 (1941).
" Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964);
1

Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
40 See, e.g., the dissenting opinions of Justices Bradley and Swayne in the Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 111, 124 (1873),
limits upon state economic regulation.
4u357 U.S. 116 (1958).

maintaining that due process imposed substantive
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frontiers as well, was a part of our heritage . . ...
"
These remarks were
echoed in Aptheker v. Secretary of State,' where the Court held unconstitutional a federal statute regulating the application of passports.
While Kent and Aptheker only dealt with the question of federal governmental limitations of international travel, it has been pointed out that
fourteenth amendment due process provides no less protection against the
states than does the fifth amendment clause against the federal government." Since there are no established guideposts, the fifth amendment
merely requiring that due process be accorded,' the extent of the due
process limitation remains. This problem will undoubtedly cause the Court
some vexation in the future, perhaps when it is faced with the precise
question of the constitutionality of an enplaning fee. Nevertheless, due
process has the advantage of allowing a balancing process between legitimate state fiscal interests and the restriction which the right to travel has
on those interests.
3. Commerce Clause. The Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate commerce among the several states, " and the movement of persons
from state to state has been held to fall within that provision in Edwards
47
v. Calfornia.
The Supreme Court in Edwards held that the right to travel
is guaranteed against oppressive state legislation by the commerce clause
and declared unconstitutional a California statute restricting the entry of
indigents into that state. Such an analysis, while arguably more difficult
to reach than the provilege or immunities clause or due process approach,
allows a direct impact on the right to travel to be set against the legitimate fiscal interests of the states, and commerce clause adjudication has
traditionally been the means of reconciling these interests.' Thus, the
"reasonable burden" test, applied to make commerce, i.e., persons moving

in commerce, bear a fair share of the cost for the use of public facilities is
the limitation applicable under the commerce clause. Again, the holding of
Capitol creates a problem in measuring the scope of the limitation.
4. Equal Protection. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment provides that "no state shall make or enforce any law which
shall . . . deny to any person ...the equal protection of the law."' The
fact some people use a public facility without being required to pay a
charge may create an equal protection objection to a use charge such as
an enplaning fee. Supreme Court practice, however, has been to review a
challenged statute on equal protection grounds only where a "fundamental" interest or a "suspect" classification is involved."0 In Shapiro v.
42id. at 125-26.
43

37 8

U.S. 500 (1964).

"Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 646 (1969)
' See Note, 23 UNIV. CHi. L. REV. 260 (1956).
41 U.S. CONST. art. III,
4'314 U.S.

160

(dissenting opinion).

(1941),

48 See notes 10-22 and accompanying text. For a criticism of the commerce clause rationale,
see CHAFEE, at 186.

41U.S. CONST. fourteenth amendment.
" See, e.g., Korcmatsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
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5 the Supreme Court, by holding unconstitutional
Thompson"
a state welfare requirement statute that was theretofore considered neither "suspect"
nor "fundamental,"'" suggested that any time a statutory distinction affects
the exercise of the right to travel, that distincion will be "suspec" and will
accordingly invite wide-ranging review by the courts. Recognition of the
interest in interstate travel as "fundamental" and therefore protected by
the equal protection clause has significant consequences in terms of state
fiscal limitations, valid or otherwise. An analysis of Shapiro shows that
state classification of indigents for purposes of determining eligibility for
welfare by residence requirements is constitutionally invalid for two reasons. First, since the freedom of interstate travel is a "fundamental" right,
statutory classifications which are adverse to this right are invalid unless
necessary to advance a "compelling" state interest. Second, although the
state's interest may be "compelling," because of the "fundamental" right
involved, the statute may nevertheelss be struck as functionally unrelated
to the purpose or is unnecessarily restrictive in light of available alternatives for achieving it. Therefore, the reasonable relation test in measuring
the validity of a public facility tax, denounced in Capitol Greyhound
Lines v. Brice,"a may arguably be reasserted, and the courts will again
appraise values to see whether one is compelling enough to sacrifice the
other, under the guise of equal protection. "

II.

NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC. V. JOINT CITY-COUNTY AIRPORT BOARD

The Montana Supreme Court in Northwest Airlines completely confuses the area of state public facility taxation vis d vis the right of interstate travel. Even though the decision is unique, it is significant only in
that it reinforces the conclusion that the courts cannot formulate a precise rule to determine the extent state interests can interfere with the right
to travel.
In Northwest Airlines the constitutionality of the tax was tested by the
fact that the taxed airlines carried passengers who were likely to move
interstate. The court declared that the rationality of the classification
could not be postulated on commerce clause criteria, "where a balance is
often struck,"' because imposing a fee measured by enplaned passengersthereby deterring those individuals from exercising their constitutional
right to travel-is absolutely banned as an "inherent possibility of complete interdiction of some activity of federal concern."' 0
Furthermore, under the court's analysis, the mere reasonable relationship between the passenger and his use of the airport would not have saved
at

U.S. 618 (1969).
542 (1940). See notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
5'See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964).
4 "When the Court demands compelling justification in addition to rational relation to purpose,
394

5 339 U.S.

the logic of equal protection is stretched beyond normal limits. The Justices are not simply saying,
'You may do A only if the class of those affected is broadened or narrowed to accord with reasonable distinction,' but rather, 'You must not accomplish objective A if it entails the sacrifice of
value B'." Note, 83 HARV. L. REv. 123, n. 19 (1969).
55
5 463 P.2d at 464.

6id.
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the statute, even though due process nexus or equal protection requirements would have otherwise been satisfied. Citing Crandall, the court
reasoned that under the privileges or immunities clause of the fourteenth
amendment, the states are completely deprived of the power to tax where
the assertion of interference with the right to travel is proved.
Sveral factors appearing in the Northwest Airlines decision can be used
to confine its impact. First, the court's conclusion that the privileges or
immunities clause absolutely protects the right to travel from state taxation is surely unsound. The right of every citizen to enjoy ingress and
egress is undoubtedly a substantial constitutionally protected right, but
the state's power to affect remotely that right by the legitimate exercise
of taxation also can hardly be doubted, especially where Congress has remained silent. 7 An enplaning fee, levided for the use of municipal airports
seems to be an entirely legitimate objective which satisfies the due process
nexus requirement and the "reasonable burden" test of th commerce
clause. A municipal airport certainly is not obliged to furnish its facilities free of charge; it is entirely rational to charge those who primarily
use them. Furthermore, the enplaning fee was levied on the airlines, the
primary users of facilities such as runways and lighting equipment. By
striking the status as an impermissible interference with the passenger's
right to travel, the court completely ignores the argument that the number of passengers carried by those airlines are directly reflective of the
amount of use of runway and lighting facilities.
Second, it is difficult to conceive that Crandall, assuming arguendo that
its rationale is still good law, is controlling in the instant case. There is no
solid foundation that a state public facility tax interferes with the right of
citizens of the United States to pass through the state and is consequently
invalid according to the doctrine announced in Crandall. In that case a
direct tax was levied upon every mode of public transportation for the
privilege of leaving the state, while the Montana statute as most attempts
to charge for the use of valuable airport facilities.
57 See Braniff Airways v. Nebraska State Board, 347 U.S. 590 (1954), where the Court refused
to preclude a state apportioned ad valorem tax on flight equipment of an interstate air carrier
on the ground that Congress, by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 49 U.S.C. § 176 (1938),
had preempted the field. See also, S. REP. No. 1661, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., H.R. Conf. Rep. No.
2635, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. In the Civil Aeronautics Act, however, Congress has declared that,
[t]he declaration of what constitutes navigable air space is an exercise of the same
source of power, the interstate commerce clause, as that under which Congress has
long declared in many acts what constitutes navigable or non-navigable air space.
- . . Federal regulation of interstate land and water carriers under the commerce
clause has not been deemed to deny all state power to tax the property of such
carriers. Id.
-Where Congress has enacted legislation showing its power, state action which would defeat the
purpose of Congress is forbidden. Buck v. Keykendall, 267 U.S. 307 (1925). By the Airport and
Airway Development and Revenue Acts of 1970, which is comprehensive Congressional legislation
regulating national expansion and improvement of the airport and airway system, Congress has
occupied much of the field of airport development. In substantial part, this purpose is to be
achieved through the imposition of user charges, measured by the purchase of airline tickets, or
the act of enplanement. Pub. L. No. 91-258 §§ 203-11 (July 1, 1970). Although Congress has
not expressly precluded the state from collecting use fees, on the reasoning of Braniff Airways,
the preemption may be by implication. See Pub. L. No. 91-258 § 210 (July 1, 1970), and H.R.
Rep. No. 601, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 50 (1969). But see Aircraft Owners & Pilots Ass'n v. Port
Authority of N.Y., 305 F. Supp. 93, 105 (1969).
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CURRENT LEGISLATION AND DECISIONS

Finally, to the degree that the court is correct in concluding that the
right to travel interstate is "fundamental to the concept of our Federal
Union," under the court's reasoning the various state purposes in imposing reasonable revenue measures would not be particularly weighty. The
court's argument in favor of interstate travel, however, simply proves too
much. If the states could not act, how would they charge for the use and
regulation of public highways? Is not the state's need for reasonable revenue collection as "absolute" as the need to protect the right to travel?
Although the decision in Northwest Airlines can be criticized for adopting the privileges or immunities clause as absolutely barring state fiscal
restrictions on interstate travel, the result may be in line with the Shapiro
expansion of equal protection review. Judicial review under Shapiro
formulations of equal protection turns on considerations substantially
similar to those which characterized the substantive due process analysis
under Hendrick v. Maryland,"' and a flat charge based on enplaning passengers, arbitrarily laid without regard to the actual use of the airport by
the passengers may now be enough to overcome' the presumptive validity
of the statute. In making the value appraisal, however, courts should give
considerable consideration to indirect use, such as runways and lighting
facilities, which are "used" by the enplaned passenger as much as he uses
the terminal building.
III. CONCLUSION

If the right to interstate travel can find protection only in the commerce clause, the argument could be advanced that the right is a privilege held by citizens only by the grace of the national government, and
thus Congress would have the power to regulate and even terminate the
movement of persons among the states because they move in interstate
commerce." On the other hand, if the right finds protection only in the
equal protection clause or by the privileges or immunities of citizenship,
the power of the states to exert legitimate fiscal policy could be unduly
restricted, as the Northwest Airlines case amply illustrates. It is therefore
impossible to formulate a precise rule by which courts may determine
whether interstate travel may be regulated by the exercise of government,
state or national. This proposition finds further support by the lack of
differentiation between the various provisions of the Constitution in more
recent Supreme Court right to rtavel cases. At least one definite conclusion
may be drawn: the right to travel is neither absolute, subject to no governmental restriction. In making an analysis of a fact situation involving state
interest opposing the right to travel, four considerations, which are the
same balancing criteria found in substantive due process, would seem
relevant:
(1) What is the constitutional source and nature of the right which
is relied on in light of the particular facts?
5 463 P.2d 464.

59235 U.S. 610 (1915). See note 18 supra.
60 See notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
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(2) What is the extent of the interference with that right?
(3) What governmental interests are served by the interference?
(4) How should the balance of the competing considerations be
struck?"
Larry Gene Alexander

"1See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.

618, 646

(1969)

(dissenting opinion).

